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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
supported by the other parts of the Treasury Department and occasionally
impelled by Congress, has developed and employed increasingly effective tools
for identifying and challenging tax-advantaged transactions entered into by cor-
porations and high income individuals. These transactions, known as "tax shel-
ters," typically promoted to the taxpayer by accounting firms, law firms or
financial institutions, rely on aggressive interpretations of tax laws to minimize,
defer or avoid U.S. federal income tax.'
Not all tax shelters are abusive. Some tax shelters, such as investments in
low-income housing, are completely legitimate.2 According to the IRS, "abu-
sive tax shelters exist solely to reduce taxes unrealistically," and "involve trans-
actions with little or no economic foundation."3 These explanations leave
plenty of room for creative interpretation and manipulation by tax shelter pro-
moters. Specifically, the IRS is targeting tax strategies that are "aggressive,
abusive transactions that follow the letter of the law, but don't pass the smell
test."'4 As a result, the IRS has used its authority to wage war on abusive tax
shelters. In response, taxpayers and advisors have asserted numerous privi-
leges, including the Federally Authorized Tax Practitioner (FATP) and "iden-
tity" privileges, in their defense and refusal to give up their clients.
* J.D. 2004, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The author
wishes to thank Professor Steve R. Johnson for his guidance.
I One definition of "tax shelter" is: (I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any investment plan
or arrangement, or (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such part-
nership, entity plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.
I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (2004). The term "tax shelter" may also mean any investment:
(A) with respect to which any person could reasonably infer from the representations made, or to
be made, in connection with the offering for sale of interests in the investment that the tax shelter
ratio for any investor as of the close of any of the first 5 years ending after the date on which
such investment is offered for sale may be greater than 2 to 1, and (B) which is (i) required to be
registered under a Federal or State law regulating securities, (ii) sold pursuant to an exemption
from registration requiring the filing of a notice with a Federal or State agency regulating the
offering or sale of securities, or (iii) a substantial investment. I.R.C. § 611 l(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2004).
2 Elizabeth Austin, Client Privilege Comes Under Heightened Scrutiny, CHI. LAW., Oct.
2003, at 34.
3 Id.
4 id.
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Part 11 of this Note describes the IRS's tools used to attack tax shelters, its
recent trends in information gathering and the relevant privileges asserted in
opposition to the government's attempts to obtain certain information. Part III
analyzes recent high-profile cases addressing these tax issues (including the
§ 7525 FATP and identity privileges), some collateral effects of these decisions
and events, and concludes by recommending that the § 7525 tax practitioner
privilege and the identity privilege (as contained in both the § 7525 privilege
and the attorney-client privilege) should be abolished in tax shelter cases.5
II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DocTRiNE
A. The Government's War on Tax Shelters
The IRS initially issued temporary and proposed regulations regarding dis-
closure and list maintenance for tax shelters on February 28, 2000. Under these
initial temporary regulations, the Treasury was dissatisfied with the minute
number of reported transactions. The government believed that certain taxpay-
ers and their advisors were interpreting the tax laws narrowly and the excep-
tions broadly as a means to avoid disclosure of tax shelters.6 As a result, the
IRS issued temporary regulations that modified the disclosure and list mainte-
nance rules.7 These regulations aim to accomplish two goals: (1) they define
which transactions are subject to the reporting, registration and list maintenance
obligations; and (2) they establish how such transactions must be reported, reg-
istered and placed on investor lists. 8 Various provisions of the Code also
address these issues and provide the IRS with the means to attack tax shelters,
which the government has utilized in its recent information-gathering efforts.9
1. Three Primary Tools Used by the IRS To Attack Shelters
The government employs three main tools in its battle against abusive
transactions: (1) enforcement of reporting, registration and list maintenance
obligations; (2) application of settlement programs, litigation resources and
penalties; and (3) broad summons power to expose individuals and
organizations.
5 A recent Tax Notes Article noted that the sixth edition of the Standards of Tax Practice
covers various new rules providing attorneys with greater latitude in disclosing client confi-
dences to protect continuing harm to others and reviews the emerging case law under
§ 7525. The book also analyzes important recent precedents (many of which are discussed
here) concerning the attorney-client scope and § 7525 privileges. Kenneth W. Gideon, Stan-
dards of Tax Practice, TAX NOTES, Sept. 27, 2004, at 1573.
6 T.D. 9017, 67 Fed. Reg. 64799, 64800; see also James A. Doering, The Final Disclosure
and List Maintenance Tax Shelter Regulations, TAXES, May 1, 2003, at 31.
7 See Richard M. Lipton, Final Corporate Tax Shelter Disclosure and List Maintenance
Regulations Impose Burdens on Everyone, J. TAX'N, March 2003, at 133.
8 George M. Clarke & Robert S. Walton, What the US War on Tax Shelter Transaction
Means, INT'L TAX REV., Sept. 1, 2003, at 2.
9 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111, 6112 and 7602 (2004).
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a. Enforcement of Reporting, Registration and List Maintenance
Obligations
Many taxpayers believe the modified reporting, registration and list main-
tenance rules, which were finalized March 4, 2003, are invasive and hard to
navigate even for regular transactions. However, on December 29, 2003, the
IRS and Treasury issued new final rules significantly reducing the circum-
stances under which confidential tax transactions must be reported to the IRS.1"
The rules relate to the disclosure of potentially abusive tax shelter transac-
tions by certain taxpayers on their federal income tax returns under Internal
Revenue Code (IRC or Code) Section 6011.1 As particularly relevant in tax
shelter cases, IRC § 6111 requires the registration of tax shelters and § 6112
requires organizers and sellers of potentially abusive tax shelters to keep lists of
their investors. In addition to the disclosure rules, the IRS modified the rules
relating to the preparation, maintenance and furnishing of lists of persons in
potentially abusive tax shelters under IRC § 6112.
The heart of the reporting obligation is Treasury Regulation § 1.6011-4(b),
which provides six categories of "reportable" transactions: (1) listed transac-
tions; (2) confidential transactions; (3) transactions with contractual protection;
(4) loss transactions; (5) transactions with significant book-tax difference; and
(6) transactions involving a brief asset holding period.1 Failure to report could
be a factor that the IRS considers in either the application of the negligence
penalty under § 6662(b)(1) or the reasonable cause and good faith exception
under § 6664.13
With regard to registration, promoters and organizers are required to regis-
ter two types of transactions: (1) confidential corporate tax shelters; and (2)
transactions that satisfy the "tax-shelter-ratio" test.' 4 To be a confidential cor-
porate tax shelter, three criteria must be met: (i) a significant purpose of the
transaction was the avoidance or evasion of U.S. Federal income tax; (ii) the
transaction was offered under conditions of confidentiality; and (iii) the tax
shelter promoters received fees in excess of $100,000 from the transaction. 15
However, in order to circumvent this regulation, many tax shelter promoters
eliminated confidentiality provisions. 6
10 T.D. 9108, 68 Fed. Reg. 75128 (Dec. 30, 2003). For discussion of the new rules, see 72
U.S. LAW WEEK 2382 (Jan. 6, 2004).
1 On August 8, 2003, the Tax Executive Institute (TEl) made suggestions for improving the
disclosure rules that would narrow the scope of the definition of reportable confidential
transactions and narrow the scope of taxpayer reporting obligations, thereby making the
rules more efficient for taxpayers and the IRS to apply. TEl Offers Suggestions for Improv-
ing Confidential Transaction Regulations, TAX MGMr. WEEKLY REPORT, Aug. 18, 2003, at
1323.
12 See Doering, supra note 6, at 32-3 for a detailed discussion of each of the six reportable
transactions.
13 Clarke & Walton, supra note 8, at 3.
14 Id. at 4. It is important to note that there are different penalty targets under the Code. For
example, failure to maintain investor lists will result in penalties for the promoter and IRC
§ 6662 imposes accuracy-related penalties on the taxpayer for portions of underpayments of
tax required to be shown on a return.
15 I.R.C. § 6111(d).
16 Clarke & Walton, supra note 8, at 5.
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Similarly, the "tax-shelter-ratio" test has proven to be an ineffective tool
for attacking corporate tax shelters. Pursuant to Treasury Regulation
§ 301.6111-2(b)(2), any transaction that is listed under Treasury Regulation
§ 1.6011-4(b)(2) has the necessary "significant purpose" to satisfy the first
prong of this test, but a non-listed reportable transaction must be registered
only if it "has been structured to produce Federal income tax benefits that con-
stitute an important part of the intended results of the transaction."' 7 This test
was clearly designed to combat conventional tax shelter investments wherein
taxpayers invest in highly leveraged partnerships or trusts in exchange for
deductions and credits generated largely by non-recourse indebtedness. How-
ever, this test does not efficiently affect many of the modem tax-advantaged
transactions. 18
Treasury Regulation § 301.6112-1 imposes an obligation on any organizer
and promoter of potentially abusive tax shelters to maintain a list of participants
in such transactions (along with other information pursuant to Treasury Regula-
tion § 301.6111-1(a)). Any transaction that must be reported under Treasury
Regulation § 1.6011-4 or registered under Treasury Regulation § 301.6111-2
gives rise to a list maintenance obligation under IRC § 6112 and Treasury Reg-
ulation § 301.6112-1. Nonetheless, only a "material advisor" will be consid-
ered an organizer or promoter for these purposes. A material advisor is any
person who has a registration obligation under IRC § 6111 or receives or
expects to receive a minimum fee and makes a "tax statement" with respect to a
reportable transaction.19
The list maintenance regulations require the preparation of lists for the
same transactions that must be disclosed. By aligning the rules for disclosure
and list maintenance, the government hopes to obtain multiple sources of infor-
mation about the same questionable transactions. 20 Although the regulations
provide procedures for claims of privileged communications, the scope of the
privilege continues to be contested, as will be discussed later in the Note.
b. Application of Settlement Programs, Litigation Resources and
Penalties
Once the IRS gathers information through reporting, registration, and list
maintenance provisions, it has a choice: resolve the tax treatment of the dis-
covered transactions administratively or litigate the resulting disputes in court.
With respect to tax shelter settlement opportunities, the IRS outlined a program
to allow taxpayers to disclose transactions, thereby precluding the application
of accuracy-related penalties.2 '
17 Id. at 4-5; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2(b)(3) (2004). The test is met if the aggre-
gate amount of deductions and 350% of the credits stemming from the transaction, divided
by the amount invested in the transaction, is greater than 2:1. Clarke & Walton, supra note
8, at 5.
18 Clarke & Walton, supra note 8, at 5.
19 A "tax statement," according to Treasury Regulation § 301.6112-1(c)(2)(iii)(A), is an oral
or written relevant statement that causes the transaction to be a reportable transaction.
20 Doering, supra note 6, at 61.
21 See I.R.C. § 6662 (2004). This section does not include fraud penalties; it applies to the
portion of any underpayment which is attributable to one or more of the following: (1)
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations; (2) any substantial understatement of income
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One goal of the settlement program was to inform the IRS about transac-
tions not previously disclosed under die preceding reporting regulations.22 As
a result, a considerable number of taxpayers made the necessary disclosures
under the program.23 A second objective of the program was to gather infor-
mation regarding particular taxpayers and specific transactions.24 In order to
comply, taxpayers were required to provide certain information and to waive
any privilege with regard to tax opinions relating to the transactions.25
While the settlement programs have since expired, the IRS has implied
that further settlement programs will be forthcoming.26 However, the prior set-
tlement programs were rigid and mandated one-sided settlements in favor of
the IRS with restricted benefit to the taxpayers. Thus, it is likely that some tax
shelters may be simply too aggressive for the government to entertain any set-
tlement that involves a partial concession by the IRS.2 7
Commentators have suggested that if the IRS's settlement programs were
a "carrot" to entice taxpayer compliance, then the threat of litigation is the
"stick."28 The IRS has the ability to target specific cases for litigation both to
coerce compliance with the government's view of the law and to create that law
through selectively choosing cases on given issues. 29 The effect of which may
likely cause a change in the eagerness of taxpayers to enter into transactions
that are driven in whole or in part by aggressive tax objectives.3°
c. Broad Summons Power To Expose Individuals and
Organizations
A third tool in the attack on abusive tax shelters is the IRS's summons
power to secure compliance with the previously discussed registration and list
maintenance requirements. Generally, when the IRS seeks information neces-
sary to perform its duties, it simply asks for, and usually gets, it.3' Sometimes,
however, either the taxpayer or a third party refuses to comply with the request
tax; (3) any substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1; (4) any substantial overstate-
ment of pension liabilities; or (5) any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement.
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(l)-(5) (2004).
22 Id.
23 Id. The IRS has initiated over 640 tax shelter promoter investigations and has at least
430 promoter leads. Amy Hamilton & Sheryl Stratton, IRS to Serve More Summonses,
Updates Shelter Stats, TAX NOTES, Nov. 3, 2003, at 567. The IRS has also issued at least
313 administrative summonses in 37 cases. Id. Approximately 100 summonses involving
nine promoters have been referred to the Department of Justice for enforcement. Id.
24 Hamilton & Stratton, supra note 23, at 567.
25 Id. In addition, taxpayers electing to enter into settlement agreements with the IRS did
not get the benefit of judicial review. CCH ANALYSIS OF Top TAX ISSUES FOR 2003, 66,
(George G Jones ed., 2003).
26 Clarke & Walton, supra note 8, at 9. The "basis-shifting" offer expired December 2,
2002 and the "contingent liability" offer expired January 3, 2003. See CCH ANALYSIS,
supra note 25, at 66.
27 Clarke & Walton, supra note 8, at 9.
28 Id. at 7.
29 Id. at 8. The increased disclosure requirements and efficient settlement programs have
allowed the IRS to pursue litigation in cases the government deems most egregious. Id.
30 Id.
31 See I.R.M. 25.5.1.4. (1999) (stating that the IRS should first ask the taxpayer for needed
information); see also Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the
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for information.32 In those cases, the government may issue a summons to
obtain the desired information.
Although the government attempts to employ informal information
requests, the possibility of the issuance of a summons enforcement action,
authorized by IRC § 7602, is the ultimate force behind such requests. It is also
the IRS's primary source of information gathering prior to trial." Because the
summons power is so broad, it is difficult for taxpayers to effectively challenge
a summons in court." Such power is consistent with administrative law gener-
ally, which typically allows wide latitude to government agencies in informa-
tion gathering.35 If anything, the IRS is afforded even more freedom than other
agencies due to the fiscal imperative of revenue collection.
3 6
2. Recent Trends in IRS Information Gathering
In 2000, the IRS revealed its attack plan for identifying and shutting down
abusive tax shelters. 37 Included in this plan were proposed rules and announce-
ments that appeared to proclaim an era of aggressive enforcement.38 However,
in 2001, the government seemed to withdraw from this stance by keeping a
startlingly low profile in comparison to the aggressive position that had been
anticipated. 39 Concurrently, though, the IRS heightened the standards measur-
ing a taxpayer's belief that its tax treatment was either generally accepted or
reasonable under the circumstances.4°
By 2002, the IRS had pulled off its gloves and gotten its hands dirty when
it began to pursue tax shelters with relentless determination. The government
suspected that it had lost tens of billions in revenue due to abusive tax shelter
activity; with tax revenue as its lifeline, the government had no choice but to
fight back.4
There were four defining events that took place in 2002 that altered the tax
shelter landscape: (1) disclosure "amnesty;" (2) stricter disclosure regulations,
in which transactions that previously had attempted to avoid IRS censure by
varying its structure slightly from that of "listed transactions," could no longer
do so; (3) expansion of those transactions targeted by the IRS to individual
taxpayers and partnerships, in addition to corporations; and (4) congressional
Partial Paradigm shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1,
32 (2004).
32 Camp, supra note 31, at 32.
33 See also I.R.C. § 7609 (2004) (special rules as to third-party summonses).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145-6 (1975); United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48 (1964).
31 United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 604 (1990); Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247,
259 (1935) (stating that "taxes are the lifeblood of government"); see also Steve R. Johnson,
Reasonable Relation Reassessed: The Examination of Private Documents by Federal Regu-
latory Agencies, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 742 (1981).
36 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 604.
37 See CCH ANALYsis, supra note 25, at 48.
38 Id.
39 Id. For example, the IRS surprised observers when it eliminated one criterion for identi-
fying a potentially abusive transaction: lack of economic substance. Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 47.
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outrage, driven by press accounts of blatant abuses.42 Significantly, the IRS
targeted not only corporate executives, but also wealthy (and even "middle-
class") individuals who sought certain tax-advantaged transactions.4 3 In addi-
tion, the IRS implemented innovative information-gathering techniques as part
of its battle against abusive tax shelters. For example, in a January 14, 2002
announcement, the government agreed to waive certain penalties relating to tax
shelters if taxpayers consented to supply particular types of information on
request.44 It was a four-month amnesty program in which taxpayers could
report shelter schemes and be immune from penalties and prosecution. Under-
standably, however, taxpayers' concern with such a deal is whether giving up
some documents believed to be privileged also waives privilege as to other
documents in the same subject-matter category. The IRS anticipated this con-
cern and addressed it in part in the Announcement by allowing participating
taxpayers to enter into agreements under which the government committed to
not assert subject-matter waiver.45
In September 2002, the IRS declared an adjustment of its audit strategy
and resources to focus on six priority areas of non-compliance with the tax
laws: (1) offshore credit card users; (2) high-risk, high-income taxpayers; (3)
42 Id. at 50.
43 Id. at 49.
44 2002-1 C.B. 304 (2002); 2002 IRB LEXIS 403 (2002); 2002-2 I.R.B. 304 (2002);
Announcement 2002-2 states in pertinent part:
[A] disclosure initiative to encourage taxpayers to disclose their tax treatment of tax shelters and
other items for which the imposition of the accuracy-related penalty may be appropriate if there
is an underpayment of tax. If a taxpayer discloses any item in accordance with the provisions of
this announcement before April 23, 2002, the IRS will waive the accuracy-related penalty under
§ 6662(b)(1), (2), (3), and (4) for any underpayment of tax attributable to that item.
This disclosure initiative covers all items except items resulting from a transaction that (1) did
not in fact occur, in whole or in part, but for which the taxpayer claimed a tax benefit on its
return; (2) involved the taxpayer's fraudulent concealment of the amount or source of any item
of gross income; (3) involved the taxpayer's concealment of its interest in, or signature or other
authority over a financial account in a foreign country; (4) involved the taxpayer's concealment
of a distribution from, a transfer of assets to, or that the taxpayer was a grantor of a foreign trust;
or (5) involved the treatment of personal, household, or living expenses as deductible trade or
business expenses.
Under this disclosure initiative, the IRS will waive the accuracy-related penalty under § 6662(b)
for that portion of an underpayment attributable to the disclosed item and due to one or more of
the following: (1) negligence or disregard of rules or regulations; (2) any substantial understate-
ment of income tax; (3) any substantial or gross valuation misstatement under chapter 1 of the
Code, except for any portion of an underpayment attributable to a net 482 transfer price adjust-
ment, unless the standards of § 6662(e)(3)(B) regarding documentation are met; and (4) any
substantial overstatement of pension liabilities.
Disclosure under this initiative does not affect whether the IRS will impose, as appropriate, any
other civil penalty that may be applicable under the Code or will investigate any associated
criminal conduct or recommend prosecution for violation of any criminal statute.
45 2002-1 C.B. 304; 2002 1RB LEXIS 403; 2002-2 I.R.B. 304. A recent case addressing
subject matter waiver is Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 2002 WL 31934139
(D. Conn. 2002). See also Robin L. Greenhouse, Michael F. Kelleher & Joshua D. Odintz,
The Service's Tax Disclosure Initiative: What Has Become of Privilege?, J. TAX'N, Oct.
2002, at 212.
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abusive schemes and promoter investigations; (4) high-income non-filers; (5)
unreported income, and (6) the National Research Program.46
First, while it is not illegal to have offshore credit cards, there is a reasona-
ble basis for believing that some taxpayers are using offshore credit cards to
evade paying U.S. federal taxes because such credit cards provide easy access
to offshore funds and accounts in tax haven countries that allow taxpayers to
hide income.47 To resist such abuse, the IRS plans to increase resources
devoted to working these cases in the upcoming fiscal years. In addition it will
serve "John Doe" summons on credit corporations for records of offshore credit
cards in order to obtain information on taxpayers using offshore credit cards to
evade Federal taxes.4 8
Second, in 2003, the IRS began using a combination of filters to identify
high-risk, high-income returns. The returns chosen for investigation are those
most likely to have unreported income or "structured transactions. 49 A struc-
tured transaction is one with limited economic benefit and whose primary func-
tion is to reduce or eliminate a tax liability.5"
Third, government attempts to attack abusive scams and schemes, includ-
ing the offshore credit card transactions, will significantly increase in the
upcoming fiscal years.5' For example, a Promoter Lead Development Center
has been established to identify and address promoter activity.52
Fourth, government attempts to address non-filers in 2004 and beyond are
focusing on "the most egregious and high-risk segments of the population."53
Fifth, because unreported income represents the biggest piece of the "tax
gap," the difference between what is reported and what should be reported, the
IRS has developed a new tool for identifying returns with a high probability of
unreported income.14  The tool, Unreported Income Discriminant Index
Formula (UI DIF), will produce a score rating the probability of income being
omitted from the return.
Sixth, the National Research Program will measure reporting compliance
and identify compliance issues, allowing the IRS to improve its efficiency.
On December 29, 2003, in an Advance Internal Revenue Bulletin Notice,
the Treasury Department and the IRS issued four items of administrative gui-
dance as part of their ongoing effort to immobilize abusive tax shelter transac-
tions and maximize effective use of IRS audit resources.55 The purpose of the
first of the items released is to improve the tax system through heightened
standards for tax advisors.5 6 The other three are intended to increase trans-
46 New Audit Strategy Focuses on 'High Risk' Noncompliance Areas, J. TAX'N, Oct. 2002,
at 195.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 IR-2003-147.
56 Id.
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parency and disclosure of information to the IRS.57 Improved disclosure, in
addition to more effectively using the information obtained, is central to the
government's strategy for identifying abusive tax-advantaged transactions early
and addressing them promptly.58 The transparency that disclosure brings
serves as a deterrent to abusive tax avoidance transactions as well.59
B. Relevant Privileges
60
A valid defense to IRS information gathering is privilege. 61 There are
four key privileges that may be applicable in this context: (1) the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege; (2) the work product doctrine; (3) the attorney-client privilege;
and (4) the "identity privilege" as a component of both the attorney-client privi-
lege and IRC § 7525.
1. Fifth Amendment Privilege
While the Fifth Amendment provides no protection based on the contents
of voluntarily prepared documents, it does protect taxpayers from compelled
production of documents where the act of production itself "could implicitly
communicate incriminating facts, such as the admission that papers existed,
were in the [producing party's] possession or control, and were authentic. 62
The privilege is generally available when either of two conditions is satisfied:
(1) where the government does not know of the existence or location of docu-
ments sought in a summons; or (2) where the production itself would provide
the basis for authentication.63 Under such circumstances, a taxpayer may be
justified in withholding certain documents requested by the IRS because the act
of producing those documents poses a risk of self-incrimination. Although tax-
payers may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to specific ques-
tions or requests (if the responses were in fact potentially incriminating),
taxpayers cannot make blanket assertions of the Fifth Amendment to avoid
attendance at a deposition or production of documents.'
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. The four items are: (1) proposed changes to Circular 230 that set high standards for
the tax advisors and firms that provide opinions supporting tax-motivated transactions; (2)
final regulations that will increase the cost of failing to disclose abusive tax avoidance trans-
actions; (3) revised final regulations clarifying that the disclosure of confidential transactions
on a return is limited to transactions for which a promoter has imposed confidentiality on a
taxpayer to protect the promoter's tax strategies from disclosure; and (4) proposed new Form
8858 requiring information reporting by U.S. persons that own foreign entities that are disre-
garded for U.S. tax purposes. Id.
I Though the "work product doctrine" is not technically a privilege, several courts have
interpreted it as such. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated October 22, 2001, 282
F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2002); Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87 (D. Md.
2003); United States v. Randall, 194 F.R.D. 369 (D. Mass. 1999); Hambarian v. Comm'r,
118 T.C. 565 (2002).
61 See generally Michael I. Saltzman, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 13.11 (1999 &
Supp. No. 3 2003).
62 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
63 United States v. Cianciulli, 2002 WL 1484396 (SDNY July 10, 2002).
4 Howard W. Goldstein, Corporate Crime: Recent Privilege Developments, N.Y. L.J.,
May 2003, col. 1.
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2. Work Product Doctrine
Under the work product doctrine, any material obtained by counsel, the
party or the party's representative in preparation or anticipation of litigation is
"work product" and therefore immune from discovery.65 In the tax law con-
text, a crucial issue in determining the availability of the work product protec-
tion is what constitutes "litigation."'66 Some consider "litigation" to be a
misnomer and argue that it should include any adversarial process, e.g., an
adversarial audit - not just actual litigation.67 However, not all courts have
agreed on this issue.6 8
The principle against invading the privacy of a professional in performing
his duties is so well recognized and essential to the orderly working of our legal
system that the party seeking work product material has the burden to show
reasons to justify such production. As the Hickman Court explained, "A law-
yer is an officer of the court, bound to work for the advancement of justice
while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients and entitled to
freedom from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel." 69
Two recent cases discussing the applicability of work product doctrine in
the tax context are In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated October 22, 200170 and
Hambarian v. Commissioner.7 1 In the former, the court, citing Hickman, noted
that the work product doctrine "establishes a zone of privacy for an attorney's
preparation to represent a client in anticipation of litigation."72 The court fur-
ther commented that "work product" is any fact obtained by an attorney, as
well as the attorney's opinions and strategies, during the course of the attor-
ney's (or taxpayer's) preparation to represent the client taxpayer in anticipation
of litigation.73 In the latter case, the court held that the mere selection of par-
ticular documents by the taxpayer's defense attorney did not automatically
transform the documents into "work product."74 Further, the taxpayer failed to
make the requisite showing of how the disclosure of the documents selected
and converted to electronic databases would reveal the defense Attorney's
mental impressions of the case. Therefore, the requested documents and com-
65 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 26). To override
immunity protection, the party seeking discovery must show: (1) a substantial need; (2) that
the information is otherwise unavailable without undue hardship; and (3) that the documents
are not mental impressions. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
66 Robert T. Smith, After the Alamo: Taxpayer Claims of Privilege and the IRS War on Tax
Shelters, TAX NOTES, Jan. 13, 2003, at 243.
67 Peter A Lowy & Juan F. Vasquez, Jr., When is the Work of a tax Professional Done in
Anticipation of Litigation and Thus 'Work Product'? J. TAX'N, Mar. 2003, at 155.
68 See Smith, supra note 66, at 243, citing United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir.
1998); McEwen v. Digitran Sys. Inc., 158 F.R.D. 678 (D. Utah 1994); and United States v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
69 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 495; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 30(b)(d), 31(d), 33, 34 and 35.
70 282 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2002) (privilege successfully asserted).
71 118 T.C. 565 (2002) (privilege unsuccessfully asserted).
72 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated October 22, 2001, 282 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002);
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
73 Grand Jury Subpoena, 282 F.3d at 161; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
7' Hambarian, 118 T.C. at 569-70.
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puterized electronic media were not protected by the work product doctrine in
the civil proceeding wherein the taxpayer challenged income tax deficiency.75
In sum, the privilege is not an "umbrella that shades all materials prepared
by the lawyer."'76 "The work product doctrine [centers] only on material
assembled and brought into being in anticipation of litigation" and excludes
materials accumulated in the ordinary course of business or pursuant to public
requirements unrelated to litigation.77
3. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is "the oldest of the privileges for confiden-
tial communications known to the common law."7 8 For centuries, an attorney's
duty to keep quiet regarding communications with a client has held a sacred
place at the center of our legal system.79 The notion of attorney-client privi-
lege dates back to Roman law. 80 In ancient Rome, attorneys were not permit-
ted to testify against their clients because it was thought that any lawyer willing
to take the stand against his client was obviously a disloyal scoundrel whose
testimony was therefore questionable.8 1
In Elizabethan England, the privilege actually belonged to the attorney due
to professional self-interest.8" For example, compelling a lawyer to testify
against his own client would discredit the attorney, which would in turn be bad
for business.8 3 In the eighteenth century, however, the view evolved to give
only the client the right to invoke or waive attorney-client privilege. 84 Accord-
ing to the U.S. Supreme Court, "the attorney-client privilege serves the function
of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients
.... It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration
of justice." 85
The elements of the privilege have been conveyed in various fashions.
Nonetheless, a common theme in these articulations is that the attorney-client
privilege requires that communication be made in confidence for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice from a lawyer.8 6 If only accounting service or account-
75 Id. at 571.
76 United States v. El Paso Co., 682 U.S. F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982).
77 Id.
71 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
19 Austin, supra note 2, at 30. Nonetheless, during the last couple of years, this privilege
has been criticized on several levels. Id. For example, some commentators have character-
ized the attorney-client privilege as little more than a "screen for scofflaw clients and their
collusive lawyers." Id. In addition, IRS Commissioner Mark Everson declared, "There are
clear indications that professional standards have eroded in some comers of the practitioner
community. Attorneys and accountants should be the pillars of our system of taxation, not
the architects of its circumvention." Id. at 32.
8 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.; see also Smith, supra note 66, at 243.
85 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985).
86 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961). One of the most quoted sum-
maries of the elements of the privilege is that of Judge Wyzanski:
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ing advice is involved, then no privilege exists.87 Should the privilege apply, it
affords confidential communications between lawyer and client absolute pro-
tection from disclosure as long as the client does not waive the privilege.88
Waiver can be express or implied, intentional or unintentional. 89 Although the
protections are vested once they attach, they are extremely fragile and easily
relinquished should the client fail to firmly preserve the confidential character
of the communication. 90
Because it impedes the full and free discovery of the truth, the attorney-
client privilege is construed narrowly. 91 For example, the privilege may not be
used as a blanket over an undifferentiated group of documents; it must be spe-
cifically asserted with respect to particular documents. 92 Additionally, prepara-
tion of tax returns is generally not "legal advice" within the scope of the
privilege.93 A few recent cases testing the application of the attorney-client
privilege in tax context are: (1) Cavallaro v. United States;94 (2) Johnson v.
Commissioner;9 5 and (3) Bria v. United States.9 6
In the first case, the court held that even if the parties to a merger and their
owners all had an exact unanimity of interest, it would not render privileged the
communications created by or shared with accountants within the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, when the accountants were providing accounting services (as
opposed to facilitating communication of legal advice between attorneys for
one of the parties and their clients).9 7
In Johnson, the court held the taxpayer impliedly waived his attorney-
client privilege when he pleaded the affirmative defense of good faith reliance
on advice of experts while defending against deficiencies and fraud penalties in
Tax Court. 98 His defense made his attorney's advice relevant to the case, and
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom
the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact
of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for
the purpose of securing either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Stpp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
87 Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922. Of course, the crime-fraud exception acts as a bar to the privi-
lege. Id.
88 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2000); Hawkins v. Stables, 148
F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 1998).
89 Smith, supra note 66, at 241. Words or conduct may be sufficient to waive the privilege
regardless of the client's intentions. Id.
9' Id. The "common interest" doctrine is an exception to the general rule that disclosure of
the communication to a third party constitutes a waiver. Id.
9' Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 F.3d at 519; United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th
Cir. 1997).
92 United States v. El Paso Co., 682 U.S. F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982).
93 Id. at 539.
94 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002), affg 153 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D. Mass. 2001) (denying applica-
tion of the privilege).
95 119 T.C. 27 (2002) (denying application of the privilege).
96 2002 WL 663862 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2002) (denying application of the privilege only in
part).
97 Cavallaro, 284 F.3d at 250.
98 Johnson, 119 T.C. at 39.
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the IRS could show that such reliance was unreasonable or did not occur only
by knowing what tax advice the taxpayer received from his attorney.99
The third case, Bria, addressed the question of the scope of the attorney-
client privilege when information is divulged to an attorney who is also acting
as a tax preparer. The court recognized the general rule that "[i]f the client
transmitted the information so that it might be used on the tax return, such a
transmission destroys any expectation of confidentiality which might have oth-
erwise existed."1°° However, the court distinguished between the actions the
attorneys took in their capacity as tax return preparers and the actions they took
as legal advisors, thereby permitting the IRS access to information with regard
to the former capacity and barring access to information with respect to the
latter. 101
4. § 7525 Federally Authorized Tax Practitioner Privilege
Unlike the well-established protections afforded to communications
between attorneys and their clients, federal common law has never recognized
an accountant-client privilege.102 In order to expand their role in providing tax-
related services, accountants lobbied Congress to receive a confidentiality priv-
ilege comparable to that enjoyed by lawyers under the common law.10 3 They
ostensibly succeeded in 1998 when IRC § 7525, the Federally Authorized Tax
Practitioner privilege (FATP or "tax practitioner" privilege), was enacted as
part of the IRS Reform and Restructuring Act.' 4
Section 7525 protects against the disclosure of the content of confidential
communications between a tax advisor and client.10 5 Thus, discussions relating
99 Id.
100 Bria v. United States, 2002 WL 663862, at *2 (D. Conn. March 26, 2002).
101 Id.
102 Smith, supra note 66, at 243.
103 Id. at 237, 243.
104 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
112 Stat. 685 (1998).
105 The privilege applies only to communications occurring after the date the statute was
enacted. I.R.C. § 7525, in its entirety, provides:
(a) Uniform application to taxpayer communications with federally authorized practitioners (1)
General rule
With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which apply to a
communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a communication between
a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would
be considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney.
(2) Limitations Paragraph
(1) may only be asserted in -
(A) any non-criminal tax matter before the Internal Revenue Service; and
(B) any non-criminal tax proceeding in Federal court brought by or against the United States. (3)
Definitions For purposes of this subsection -
(A) Federally authorized tax practitioner
The term "federally authorized tax practitioner" means any individual who is authorized under
Federal law to practice before the Internal Revenue Service if such practice is subject to Federal
regulation under section 330 of title 31, United States Code.
(B) Tax advice
The term "tax advice" means advice given by an individual with respect to a matter which is
within the scope of the individual's authority to practice described in subparagraph (A).
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to the receipt of tax advice, given by a tax practitioner, generally enjoy the
same confidentiality protections as communications with an attorney.'6 There
are many exceptions, however. 10 7 The privilege does not apply in criminal tax
matters, or to corporate tax shelters, i.e., written communications between a tax
practitioner and a director, shareholder, officer, employee, agent or representa-
tive of a corporation in connection with the promotion of the participation of
the corporation in a tax-advantaged transaction. 10 8
United States v. Frederick discussed the § 7525 privilege. 0 9 The court
held that, while there is no common law accountant's or tax preparer's privi-
lege, § 7525 protects communications between a taxpayer and a federally
authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would be consid-
ered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney.
It does not protect work product, nor does it entitle a non-lawyer to privilege
when they are doing other than a lawyer's work." 0
Information communicated by a taxpayer for the purpose of tax prepara-
tion, such as a taxpayer's name, does not create a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality because tax returns are disclosed to third parties."' Generally,
under both the attorney-client and FATP privilege, a client's identity is not
protected from disclosure. 1 2 However, the identity privilege may apply to
identity disclosures in limited circumstances where the IRS has uncovered so
much of a confidential communication that the mere identification of the tax-
payer would effectively disclose the communication.' 13 Consequently, one of
the issues relating to the identity privilege that has been left unresolved is
whether, and to what extent, this privilege allows a tax practitioner to refuse to
disclose a taxpayer's name if the IRS requests it as part of an investigation. l 14
The above-mentioned privileges are not confined to any one form, as their
scope is shaped by their purpose and principle." 5 Thus, the development and
application of the privileges remain the duty of the courts." 16
(b) Section not to apply to communications regarding corporate tax shelters. The privilege under
subsection (a) shall not apply to any written communication between a federally authorized tax
practitioner and a director, shareholder, officer, or employee, agent, or representative of a corpo-
ration in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of such corporation
in any tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii)).
106 I.R.C. § 7525 (2004).
107 See Part III.B. for a more detailed discussion of this privilege's pitfalls and why it
should be abolished.
108 I.R.C. § 7425(a)(1)-(b) (2004).
109 182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000).
"0 Id. at 502. For further case discussion, see Part HI below.
"' United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003).
112 United States v. BDO Seidman, 2003 WL 932365, at * 1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2003).
113 Id.
114 For further discussion of this privilege, see, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Proposed Tax
Advisor-Client Privilege: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Come, 78 TAX NoTEs 1041
(1998); Louis Lobenhofer, The New Tax Practitioner Privilege: Limited Privilege and Sig-
nificant Disruption, 26 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 243 (2000).
" United States v. El Paso Co., 682 U.S. F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982).
116 Smith, supra note 66, at 236.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. IRS Flexes Its Muscles: Enforcement Actions in the Latest Vastly
Publicized Cases
As mentioned in Part II, the government's tax shelter strategy requires
promoters to identify and register potentially abusive tax shelters, maintain lists
of investors and provide the IRS with investor lists. Should the IRS desire
confirmation of such compliance, it may audit these promoters.
The IRS has conducted numerous investigations of promoters, served hun-
dreds of summonses and identified a significant number of abusive transac-
tions. 117 For that reason, while the following are the most prominent cases in
this area of tax, they are by no means comprehensive.
1. Decided Cases
a. KPMG LLP
In 2002, the government served twenty-five summonses on KPMG to
determine the firm's compliance under the registration and list requirements.118
Although KPMG produced eighty-four boxes of documents, the IRS claimed
that the firm failed to completely comply, and in June 2002, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) petitioned the court to enforce the summonses." 9 KMPG pro-
duced an additional 183 boxes, but prepared a document-by-document privilege
log for certain documents it withheld on privilege grounds. 2 '
Judge Hogan, holding that much of the documentation may be character-
ized as tax return preparation and thus not protected under the § 7525 tax prac-
titioner privilege, referred the privilege log to a Special Master, retired
Magistrate Judge Attridge, to conduct an examination of the withheld docu-
ments, evaluate the asserted privileges and submit a Recommendation to the
court. 121
117 In August 2003, Eileen O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division,
stated that the IRS had taken the following actions to combat abusive transactions: (1)
investigated 99 promoters, including law firms, investment banks, and accounting firms; (2)
issued 272 summonses to 35 promoters since January 1, 2002 to acquire information on
compliance with the registration and list requirements; (3) obtained investor lists from at
least 25 promoters for numerous transactions; (4) identified 27 abusive tax shelters through
formal guidelines; and (5) via a variety of sources, audited taxpayers to determine whether
they invested in abusive transactions. See IRS Sues to Enforce Promoter Summonses, Get
Investor Names from Jenkens & Gilchrist, TAX MGMT. WEEKLY REPORT, Aug. 18, 2003, at
1327. By November 2003, the IRS revealed its latest actions in a "background information"
sheet that included the following information: (1) 640 promoter investigations with another
430 promoter leads (in addition, the IRS stated that the Small Business/Self-Employed Lead
Development Center is receiving an average of 105 promoter leads per month); and (2) 313
administrative summonses issued to 37 promoters. See Amy Hamilton & Sheryl Stratton,
IRS to Serve More Summonses, Updates Shelter Stats, TAX NoTEs, Nov. 3, 2003, at 567.
118 United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 36 (D.D.C. 2002).
19 Id.
120 Id. at 36-7.
121 Id. at 48. For competing views of this decision, compare Lee A. Sheppard, No Privilege
for Tax Planning, TAX NoTEs, Jan. 13, 2003, at 159, with Jay L. Carlson & David A.
Roman, The Tax Advice Privilege is Alive and Well, TAX NoTEs, Apr. 21, 2003, at 399.
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Judge Attridge has since issued two reports. In the first, delivered in Janu-
ary 2003, the Special Master determined that KPMG failed to show that two of
three documents were protected from disclosure under the § 7525 privilege
because the documents were prepared as exhibits in support of disclosures
made on the tax returns of investors. 22 A third category was considered pro-
tected under the attorney-client privilege. 1 3
The Special Master issued his second and final report on October, 8, 2003,
after reviewing the remaining documents and supplemental submissions, reex-
amining KPMG's privilege log, the entire record and Judge Hogan's previous
opinion. 11 With respect to the tax practitioner privilege, Judge Attridge relied
mainly on two Seventh Circuit opinions: United States v. Frederick 125 and
United States v. Lawless. 126 Based on these opinions, he recommended that
certain types of documents be protected under § 7525, including but not limited
to: KPMG memos regarding conversations with clients discussing the conse-
quences of proposed tax legislation; internal memos discussing tax advice
given to clients; KPMG letters to clients including tax information, tax advice,
tax planning and tax opinions; and various types of e-mails communicating tax
advice. 12 7 Other documents, however, were said to be unprotected by § 7525.
For instance, documents containing information relating to tax returns, business
matters (as opposed to client-specific advice) and policy issue discussions were
not privileged. 128 Thus, it appears that that the FATP privilege is still alive in
the KPMG case.
129
More recently, Judge Hogan granted the government's petition to enforce
the summonses against KPMG. 1 30 In a harsh opinion, the court stated that it
had "lost confidence in KPMG's privilege log since it has been shown to be
inaccurate, incomplete, and even misleading regarding a very large percentage
122 Doc. 2003-66451; 2003 TNT 52-18; see also Sheryl Stratton, Special Master Recom-
mends Court Find KPMG Docs Privileged, TAX NOTES, Oct. 27, 2003, at 444. The two
categories varied only in that one set of documents included further analysis articulating that
there was at least a fifty percent probability that the transactions would be upheld if the IRS
challenged them. Id.
123 Stratton, supra note 122, at 444.
124 Doc. 2003-22677; 2003 TNT 202-12. For a detailed discussion of the Special Master's
recommendation with regard to each of the privileges asserted, see Stratton, supra note 122,
at 444-47.
125 182 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussed in Part II supra).
126 709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Although, on December 8 2003, the DOJ accused KPMG of noncompliance and
obstructing justice after the firm allegedly delayed disclosing documents to the IRS. Doc
2003-26292; 2003 TNT 239-16. See also Kenneth A. Gary, KPMG Accused of Noncompli-
ance, Obstructing Justice, TAX NOTES, Dec. 15, 2003, at 1254. In November 2003, KMPG
released another privilege log disclosing an additional 21 documents of which the DOJ had
no prior knowledge. Id. As such, the filing requests the court to waive the claim of privi-
lege and order production of the documents because "[a]fter nearly two years of dodging the
IRS and this Court, KPMG should not be allowed to assert new reasons it is not complying
with these summonses." Id.
"I See United States v. KMPG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2004).
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of the documents."'' In holding the § 7525, attorney-client and work products
privileges invalid, KPMG was ordered to produce all of the documents related
to the OPIS and FLIP transactions as specified in the January 28, 2002,
summons. 1
32
b. BDO Seidman
The IRS sought enforcement of summonses against accounting firm BDO
Seidman, LLP (BDO) for its alleged failure to properly disclose potentially
abusive tax-advantaged transactions that the firm promoted.' 3 3 On October 10,
2002, the district court held that: (1) the summonses were prima facie issued in
good faith and (2) the firm's claim of privilege required examination of.each
document by Magistrate Judge Ashman. 1
34
After the court ordered disclosure of certain documents, BDO appealed.
135
Two separate groups of John Doe clients ("Does" and "Roes") of BDO sought
to intervene in the summonses enforcement action.' 3 6 The Seventh Circuit
remanded, allowing the district court to enter more extensive findings regarding
documents as to which proposed intervenor-appellants asserted privilege.'3 7
The district court, on remand, held that information with respect to the identity
of BDO's clients was not privileged and that the clients were not entitled to
intervene. '3 8 That decision was also appealed in July 2003, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, ruling that the information regarding the identity of the clients who
had consulted with a tax shelter promoter, BDO, with respect to their participa-
tion was not protected from disclosure under § 7525 in a tax enforcement
action against the promoter. 139
The FATP privilege did not apply because the clients failed to prove that a
confidential communication would be disclosed if their identities were
known."'4 In addition, because the IRC §§ 6111 and 6112 require that promot-
ers register and maintain lists of every tax shelter investor-client, the court rea-
soned, the clients had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality with regard
to their participation in the tax shelter investments."' Significantly, the court
noted that while the identity privilege exists in limited instances, just as it does
in the attorney-client context generally, information provided to a tax practi-
131 Id. at 44; see also Sheryl Stratton, BDO Court Rules Attorney-Client Privilege Applies
To Shelters, TAX NOTES, July 12, 2004, at 125.
132 Id.
133 United States v. BDO Seidman, 225 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. I11. 2002).
134 Id.
13 United States v. BDO Seidman, 2002 WL 32080709 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 United States v. BDO Seidman, 2003 WL 932365 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
139 Id. In addition, the Does and Roes filed a motion to stay the issuance of the court
mandate pending a petition for writ of certiorari. Doc. 2003-21218; 2003 TNT 187-17; see
also Summaries/Court Opinions, TAX NOTES, Oct. 6, 2003, at 79. The court denied the
motion because the appellants failed to prove that they had a reasonable probability of suc-
cess on the merits. Id. It also noted that the motion was procedurally incomplete. United
States v. BDO Seidman, No. 02-3914; No. 02-3915 (7th Cir. Sept. 25, 2003).
140 BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802.
141 Id.
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tioner for the purpose of preparing a tax return is not privileged. 142 The § 7525
privilege does not include communications about tax return preparation. It
encompasses only information such as tax advice.143
c. Ernst & Young
In April 2002, the government served accounting firm Ernst & Young
(E&Y) a summons demanding a wide range of documents relating to one alleg-
edly abusive transaction and all other similar transactions executed by the
firm. 14 4 E&Y's clients expressed that they did not want their identities known
and directed E&Y to assert the § 7525 privilege.145 The clients, "Does,"
argued that their identities as taxpayers who invested in tax shelters could not
be determined from the information revealed by their tax returns filed by
E&Y."'4 6 As such, not only had the privilege not been waived, but disclosing
their identities to the government would reveal the nature of the advice sought
from E&Y.
147
Similar to the BDO case discussed above, however, the clients' attempt to
intervene by means of John Doe litigation was dismissed.148 The court sug-
gested that the identity privilege was inapplicable when an accounting firm is
used as a return preparer. 149 Nonetheless, the case was ultimately dismissed
because the IRS had independently ascertained the clients' identities. 50
d. Arthur Andersen LLP
In April 2002, the government issued nineteen administrative summonses
to Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen) as part of an investigation into the firm's
compliance with the IRC regulations governing potentially abusive tax-
advantaged transactions.' 5 ' After the clients were informed about the sum-
monses, two groups of independent investors sought to intervene ("Does" and
142 Id.; see also Cassell Bryan-Low, Court Rules Tax Shelter Clients Lack Privilege of Con-
fidentiality, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2003, at 1.
143 Id. However, under the Seventh Circuit's 2002 decision, the court articulated a four-
prong test to determine whether the identity privilege exists under the § 7525 protection: (1)
Was the purpose of the transaction to provide tax advice? (2) In light of such purpose and
the history of the firm's representation, would disclosing the clients' identities necessarily
reveal their motives for seeking tax advice? (3) Did the clients waive the privilege, i.e.,
would the IRS have been able to ascertain the client names independent of the firm? (4)
Was the document or communication made for the purpose of preparing the clients' tax
returns? According to the court, in order for the clients' identities to be privileged under
§ 7525, the answers to the first two questions must be yes, and the answers to the last two
questions must be no. BDO Seidman, 2002 WL 32080709 (N.D. Ill. 2002). See also Confi-
dentiality-How Protected is Communication With a Tax Advisor? CONTROLLER'S TAX
LETTER, July 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8916737. Thus, it is unclear how relevant these
inquires are in light of the 2003 opinion.
14 Sheryl Stratton, Identity Privilege Pits Shelter Clients Against Accounting Firms, TAX
NOTES, Jan. 13, 2003, at 168.
145 Stratton, supra note 144, at 168.
146 Id. at 169.
147 Id. at 169-70.
148 Ernst & Young, No. 02-CV-10100 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20. 2002).
149 Id.
150 Id.
"' United States v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 273 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. Il. 2003).
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"Roes") and asserted the § 7525 privilege. 152 On the IRS's motion to compel
compliance with a production order, on June 30, 2003, the district court held
that: (1) the investors' identities were protected by the FATP privilege and (2)
the investors were permitted to intervene using fictitious names.' 53 But before
the investors could celebrate the victory, the July 23rd BDO decision rained on
their parade.
The Seventh Circuit handed down its BDO ruling just a few weeks after
the June 30th decision. In light of the recent opinion, the IRS filed a motion to
reconsider the Andersen district court's order. Reluctantly, on August 15,
2003, the district court granted the government's motion, holding that the
investors may not assert the identity privilege under § 7525 and therefore their
identities must be revealed to the IRS.
154
The court concluded that it was bound by the Seventh Circuit's "generally
applicable prohibition on the assertion of the identity privilege" in IRS sum-
mons enforcement actions, which appears unchangeable by varying factual cir-
cumstances.155 The Andersen district court even went so far as to admit that
the BDO opinion left the court "puzzled as to the correct outcome" in the prin-
cipal case. 156 Concerned about the dangers of an unrestricted exercise of the
IRS summons power, possibly resulting in an unfair infringement on the tax-
payer's entitlement to privacy, the court expressed its hope that Congress
explicitly state its purpose underlying Code §§ 6111 and 6112 to include target-
ing for penalties those taxpayers who participate in abusive tax shelters.
157
e. Wachovia Corp.
Just a week prior to the June 30th Andersen district court decision, a dis-
trict court in North Carolina denied injunctive relief to shelter investors seek-
ing, on privilege grounds, to prevent Wachovia bank (Wachovia) from turning
over investor lists. 158 The investors had used Wachovia to invest in allegedly
abusive tax shelters. KPMG, LLP provided accounting advice and Jenkens &
Gilchrist provided legal advice.159 Thus, the Wachovia action was procedur-
ally different from the previously discussed Andersen and BDO summons
enforcement proceedings because the IRS was not a party in the case. Further-
more, the investors, who used the bank to facilitate a tax strategy for which
Jenkens & Gilchrist provided legal advice and KPMG provided accounting
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 2003 WL 21956404, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14228 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The action has been stayed pending the investors' appeal to the
circuit court. Id.
155 Id. at *6. The Andersen court reviewed its understanding of the four factual inquiries to
determine whether the identity privilege exists under § 7525, set forth in the Seventh Cir-
cuit's 2002 BDO opinion, but the Seventh Circuit's broad language in the 2003 opinion left
the Andersen court questioning the role of the four factors under the 2002 decision. Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at *7. For more discussion of the case and its history, see Sheryl Stratton, "No
Identity Privilege for Andersen Investors, Court Reluctantly Rules," TAX NoTEs, Aug. 25,
2003, at 985-7.
158 Doe v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 627 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
159 Id.
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advice, claimed the § 7525 privilege.16 ° The investors sought protection by
claiming that Wachovia communicated privileged information to both the law
and accounting firms to implement the tax strategy.
1 6
'
The court ruled that no attorney-client relationship existed between the
investors and the law firm because the law firm merely sold a package to the
investors that contained a description of the transaction and a memo as to the
potential tax consequences stemming from the transaction. 162 Further, the court
determined that the FATP privilege was inapplicable because the communica-
tions fell within the corporate tax shelter exception under § 7525(b).
163
Prior to this decision, there had been much uncertainty over how the cor-
porate tax shelter exception would be applied. 164 Notably, the United States
District court for the Northern District of North Carolina was the first to
expressly hold that an individual taxpayer's communications will not be privi-
leged if they relate to a shelter transaction involving a corporation.
165
f G-I Holdings, Inc.
GAF Chemical Corp. (GAF) is G-I Holdings, Inc.'s predecessor. 166 In
1990, GAF entered into a partnership with Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. where each
corporation contributed property to create a limited partnership.' 67 In 1993, the
IRS audited the partnership, but did not make any adjustments regarding the
1990 transaction.1 68 The partnership was audited a second instance in 1996;
this time, the IRS reviewed the transfer of property to the partnership. 169 The
government asserted tax deficiencies against GAF and Rhone-Poulenc after
concluding that the property transfer constituted a taxable sale as opposed to an
IRC § 721 nontaxable contribution.' 70
In their defense, the taxpayers claimed reasonable reliance on the advice
given to them by their tax advisors, William S. McKee and William F. Nelson,
regarding the 1990 property transfer.'71 As a result, the IRS attempted to dis-
cover the communications between the corporations and McKee and Nelson.'
7 1
160 See Sheryl Stratton, Privilege Sidelines Shelter Actions, Government Changes Tack,
TAx NOTES, July 21, 2003, at 295.
161 Id. After Wachovia decided to comply with the summons, several investors brought suit
against the bank asserting various theories, including breach of contract and breach of fiduci-
ary duty. Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
162 Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
163 Id. The court examined the language of the § 7525 exception and the § 6662(d)(2)(C)
definition of shelter. After reviewing one Jenkens & Gilchrist tax opinion, the court deter-
mined that the tax-advantaged transaction necessitated the participation of a corporation, and
therefore rendered the privilege inapplicable.
164 Doe. 2002-20732; 2002 TNT 176-19; see Sheryl Stratton, Privilege Sidelines Shelter
Actions, Government Changes Tack, TAx NOTES, July 21, 2003, at 295.
165 Stratton, supra note 164, at 295.
166 In re G-I Holdings, Inc., 2003 WL 22300502 (D.N.J. 2003). See also Sheryl Stratton,
Another Privilege Argument Fails; Nelson, McKee To Be Deposed, TAx NOTES, Aug. 4,
2003, at 634.
167 G-I Holdings, 2003 WL 22300502.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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On July 17, 2003, the New Jersey court ruled that, because the tax advi-
sors did the tax planning for the transaction (including writing the opinion letter
upon which the corporations relied as an affirmative defense), such communi-
cation was in question.1 73  In effect, by asserting the reasonable reliance
defense, there was waiver of all the communications between the corporations
and the advisors, thereby limiting the application of privilege to the
information. 
174
1. Pending Cases
a. Jenkens & Gilchrist P.C.
On June 19, 2003, the government served a John Doe summons on one of
the country's largest law firms, Jenkens and Gilchrist (J&G), seeking to obtain
information on some listed transactions and other potentially abusive transac-
tions organized or sold by the firm's Chicago office. 175 This action marked the
first time the government has summoned a law firm in its war against tax
shelters.
17 6
According to the IRS, J&G clients claimed at least $2.4 billion in artificial
losses from their investments, chiefly from COBRA (currency options bring
reward alternatives), a proprietary version of the "son of BOSS shelter."' 177
The government believes that the attorneys were not acting solely in their
capacities as lawyers, but were promoters required to comply with the Code
regulations and turn over their client lists. 178 J&G refuted that belief and
resisted the summons on the ground of attorney-client privilege.
179
J&G CEO William P. Durbin has commented, "Our clients expected con-
fidentiality when they sought legal advice concerning their taxes ... it is well
established that the privilege covering our dealings with clients belongs to
them, and that we must assert it on their behalf. We have done so. '' 180 As
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 No. 03C5693 (N.D. Ill.).
176 John McKinnon & Cassell Bryan-Low, U.S. Sues Law Firm in Tax-Shelter Crackdown,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2003. A John Doe summons differs from an administrative summons
in that it suspends the statute of limitations for assessing tax deficiencies for the investors is
automatically suspended beginning six months after the service of the summons while objec-
tions related to the summons are resolved. Amy Hamilton, Government Seeks Enforcement
of Summons on Jenkens & Gilchrist, TAX NoTEs, Aug. 18, 2003, at 877.
177 In one typical form of a son of BOSS shelter, a taxpayer purchases and writes economi-
cally offsetting options and then purports to create substantial positive basis by transferring
those option positions to a partnership. On the disposition of the partnership interest (the
liquidation of the partnership or the taxpayer's sale or depreciation of distributed partnership
assets), the taxpayer will claim a tax loss, even though the taxpayer has not incurred a corre-
sponding economic loss. See Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255; see also Temp. Reg.
§ 1.752-6 (2004).
178 Jenkens & Gilchrist PC, No. 03C5693 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2004). See also Hamilton,
supra note 176, at 877.
179 Jenkens, No. 03C5693.
180 Hamilton, supra note 176, at 877. Durbin further stated, "The law deems this exchange
between a lawyer and a client confidential. This confidential communication between client
and lawyer is the essence of attorney-client privilege, and the identity of the clients is an
important element of the privilege in this case." Id.
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such, the issue is whether lawyers are acting beyond their advisor role and
becoming promoters.' 81 If the attorney is found to be selling a tax shelter (as
opposed to providing legal advice), the privilege disappears. 182
The IRS subsequently filed an action requesting the district court to
enforce compliance with the John Doe summons and with five administrative
summonses the government had issued as part of its examination of J&G's
possible promotion of tax shelters on August 14, 2003.183
On May 14, 2004, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois ordered the firm to comply with the summonses seeking identities and
other relevant information. The next month, Judge Moran held J&G's clients'
identities unprotected by the attorney-client privilege.' 84
b. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP
In October 2003, the IRS served a John Doe summons on the law firm
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood (Sidley) for information on more than 370 indi-
viduals or entities who participated in a listed transaction organized or sold by
the firm.t8 5 It was the second time in a year the IRS filed summonses against a
Chicago law firm seeking the names of clients. 186 The government received
approval from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to
serve the summons to obtain the identities of clients who invested in listed
transactions or other potentially abusive transactions organized or sold by the
law firm's Chicago office. 187
Specifically, the IRS is sought from the law firm and Brown & Wood
LLP,'88 the names, addresses and taxpayer identification numbers of all U.S.
clients who participated in listed or potentially abusive transactions organized
or sold by the firm's Chicago office during any part of the period from January
1, 1996 to October 15, 2003.189 Pursuant to its petition, the IRS believed
Sidley developed and/or sold a number of transactions.190 In addition, the gov-
ernment discovered more than thirteen transactions for which Sidley provided
approximately six hundred opinions.19' In response, Sidley gave the IRS "non-
181 See Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 627; see also Richard Acello, Give 'Em Shelter?
Some Tax Shelters Can Expose Attorneys and Firms to Grief and Liability, A.B.A. J. E-
REPORT, July 25, 2003.
182 See Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 627.
183 Jenkens & Gilchrist PC, No. 03C5693. Doc. 2003-22851; O'Connor Testifies on Tax
Shelters at Finance Committee Hearing, 2003 TNT 204-33, Oct. 21, 2003.
184 Sheryl Stratton, Jenkens & Gilchrist Turns Over Investor Lists, TAX NOTES, May 24,
2004, at 944.
185 Karla L. Miller, Justice Releases Exhibits in Sidley Austin Summons Enforcement
Action, 2004 TNT 1-14, Jan. 2, 2004.
186 Stephanie Francis Ward, IRS Wants Sidley to Name Names, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Nov.
7, 2003.
187 Amy Hamilton, IRS Serves John Doe Summons to Second Law Firm, TAX NOTES, Oct.
20, 2003, at 316; Sidley Austin Second Law Firm To Be Served with John Doe Summons,
U.S. LAW WEEK, Oct. 21, 2003, at 2224.
188 The law firm of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood is a product of the merger between the
two firms Sidley Austin and Brown & Wood.
189 Hamilton, supra note 187, at 316.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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client specific" documents concerning many of the transactions. However, the
firm withheld information that would identify its clients.
19 2
In a prepared statement, Sidley maintained that it "ha[d] been cooperating
and will continue to cooperate with the IRS by producing the material
requested to the extent consistent with professional responsibilities." 193 None-
theless, on December 29, 2003, the government announced that it was petition-
ing a U.S. district court for enforcement of the summons, citing Sidley's failure
to respond to its requests.1 94 Clearly, privilege claims regarding a substantial
number of documents have yet to be resolved by the court.
c. Presidio/Grant Thorton LLP
In order to identify tax shelter investors, the government has served John
Doe summonses on the Presidio Group companies, two individuals who man-
aged and owned them, and Grant Thorton LLP, a leading global public
accounting firm serving middle-market companies.19 5 The Justice Department
has since filed a petition in federal district court in the District of Columbia to
enforce nine administrative summonses issued to the Grant Thornton firm. 1 9 6
This was the sixth summons enforcement proceeding filed against a tax shelter
promoter.' 97
B. Some Collateral Consequences
While there have been a number of developments as a result of the events
and controversies discussed earlier, two noteworthy changes are: (1) an
increase in tax shelter clients suing their attorneys and advisors; and (2)
changes in ethics and conduct.
With regard to the first, many disgruntled taxpayers are suing their
accounting firms and law firms that acted as tax shelter promoters.19 8 In most
cases, these former clients claim that their advisors breached a duty of confi-
dentiality when the advisors sold the tax shelters and that the advisors should
have somehow protected the clients' identities from being disclosed.1 99 For
example, Jenkens & Gilchrist and Sidley are two firms experiencing this devel-
opment first hand. J&G has been named in at least one lawsuit filed by affluent
clients suing their lawyers and other advisors for tax advice. 2" Sidley is also
192 Id.
193 Id.
1 Miller, supra note 185.
1 See Amy Hamilton & Sheryl Stratton, IRS To Serve More Summonses, Updates Shelter
Stats, TAx NoTEs, Nov. 3. 2003, at 567.
196 Kenneth A. Gary, Year In Review: Tax Shelter Crackdown Efforts Steer Government
Policy, TAX NOTES, Jan. 5, 2004, at 35.
197 Id.
198 Lee A. Sheppard, Confidentiality and Customer Relations, TAX NOTES, June 2, 2003, at
1303; see, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Wealthy Family is Suing Lawyer Over Tax Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2003, at C1.
199 Sheppard, supra note 198, at 1303.
20 McKinnon & Bryan-Low, supra note 176.
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named as a defendant in the suit.20' Sidley has also been named in at least two
other suits by wealthy individuals claiming they were sold bad tax advice. 2
Second, many changes in ethics and conduct have taken place. For
instance, on August 11, 2003, the American Bar Association (ABA) amended
its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.6, to permit law-
yers to reveal information usually protected by the attorney-client privilege in
order to prevent a client from committing financial fraud or to mitigate the
damages from it.20
3
The ethical climate of corporate tax departments has also changed, partic-
ularly due to the Code's revised disclosure and list maintenance require-
ments .2 0' According to Ernest J. Dronenburg Jr., a former member of the
California State Board of Equalization and Franchise Tax Board and currently
with Deloitte & Touche, while the tax departments of many major corporations
"changed from cost centers to profit centers in the pre-Enron period[, now] the
tax department is a damage-control center. .. the ethical pendulum has swung
to the conservative edge." 20 5
With respect to taxpayers, although personal integrity remains the strong-
est deterrent to noncompliance, the fear of being audited is increasing.20 6 Fear-
ing a tax audit is, to a greater extent, the reason that some taxpayers are
complying and paying their fair share of taxes.20 7 It appears as though the
IRS's crackdown on tax shelters is playing a significant role in these changes.
C. Recommendation
1. Abolish the § 7525 Tax Practitioner Privilege
As discussed in Part II. B, there are a number of privileges that may be
asserted in tax shelter cases. In particular, the FATP privilege has been criti-
cized since its inception. 2 8 Not only does the tax practitioner privilege provide
less protection than the attorney-client privilege, it may deceptively provide a
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Current Developments: ABA Amends Rule on Client Confidentiality to Allow Lawyers
to Disclose Financial Fraud, TAX MGMT. WEEKLY REPORT, Aug. 18, 2003, at 1325. Con-
gress also enacted the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act on August 5, 2003 to promulgate rules of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing before the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. Id. The rules require lawyers to report corporate authority violations of the securities
law and other failures of legal compliance to the highest levels of corporate authority. Id.
204 Thomas F. Field, Tax Shelters: Have Ethics Changed?, TAX NOTES, Nov. 17, 2003, at
823. Accordingly, I would not be surprised to see more headlines in the news concerning the
expulsion of partners from their firms. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton and Sheryl Stratton, IRS to
Serve More Summonses, Updates Shelter States: Sidley Partner Expelled, TAX NOTES, Nov.
3, 2003, at 568.
205 Field, supra note 204, at 823. Some commentators lament what they perceive to be an
erosion of the legal "profession" into the legal "business." Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide
Shut: Surveying Erosion in the Professionalism of the Tax Bar, TAX NOTES, Oct. 27, 2003,
at 517.
206 Amy Hamilton, Taxpayer Fear of Audits on Rise, IRS Oversight Board Finds, TAX
NOTES, Nov. 3, 2003, at 577.
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 114; Lobenhofer, supra note 114.
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false sense of security for the unwary.2 °9 Based on the succeeding points, some
of which were mentioned earlier, the § 7525 privilege should be abolished.
First, the FATP privilege is very narrow and only extends a privilege akin
to the attorney-client privilege to communications with certified public
accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries. Because it explicitly relies
on the attorney-client privilege to establish the scope of its protections, the
§ 7525 privilege contains all of the restrictions of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 21 ° To boot, the tax practitioner privilege contains many other considera-
ble statutory limitations and undesirable effects. The aggregation of such
confines makes the privilege almost useless. As the Upjohn Court articulated:
"An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all."21 1
Another downside is the tax practitioner privilege may not be asserted in
criminal matters.2 1 2 Because our law enforcement system includes criminal
and civil elements that are "inherently intertwined," determining whether an
investigation is criminal or could become criminal is often problematic. 213 It
appears that the mere commencement of a criminal investigation is sufficient to
overcome the privilege.
2 14
In tax cases, most criminal investigations start out as civil proceedings;
thus, the FATP privilege may be lost as soon as the proceedings transition from
civil to criminal.21 5 While there are relatively few criminal tax cases prose-
cuted annually, this type of ephemeral privilege is likely to cause uncertainty
and confusion among taxpayers who believed that communications made to
their advisors were confidential regardless of the nature of the proceeding.216
Such status is particularly disturbing due to the fact that the IRS is able to
transform a civil proceeding into a criminal one almost effortlessly.2 17 As
such, in cases where the assertion of the privilege prompts a criminal investiga-
tion to eliminate the privilege, the existence of the § 7525 may put the taxpayer
in a shoddier position than had there been no privilege at all.2 18
Third, § 7525 is limited to communications regarding "tax advice," which
is "advice given by an individual with respect to a matter within the scope of
the individual's authority to practice" before the IRS.2 19 Impliedly, Congress'
vague definition leaves it up to the courts to decide what constitutes "tax
209 Smith, supra note 66, at 238.
210 Id.
211 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
212 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2)(A) (2004).
213 Smith, supra note 66, at 244 (quoting United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S.
298, 309 (1978)).
214 Id.
215 Id. at 245.
216 Id. The privilege may be considered ephemeral because it is "one that appears and
disappears during the life of a single investigation." Id.
217 Id. For example, the IRS could instigate a criminal investigation by simply claiming
that the taxpayer evaded taxes in violation of I.R.C. § 7201 to defeat the privilege. Id.
218 Id. While this may be theoretically possible, it is unlikely that that the IRS would
attempt to abuse its power in this manner.
219 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(3)(B) (2004).
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advice."22 Trying to distinguish "tax advice" from general accounting ser-
vices is not always simple, often requiring courts to conduct in camera reviews
of masses of documents to separate the privileged items involving tax advice
from the unprivileged items."' As the Seventh Circuit recently held, the
§ 7525 privilege does not include communications about tax return prepara-
tion. 222 Although just as drawing the line between legal and non-legal advice
is difficult in the attorney-client context, separating tax advice from tax returns
in the FATP-client context can also be complicated.
Another drawback is that the privilege is restricted to tax proceedings
before the IRS or matters "in Federal Court brought by or against the United
States. 223 In other words, the FATP privilege may only be applicable in IRS
matters and proceedings with the U.S. government in Tax Court, federal district
court, Court of Federal Claims, and bankruptcy courts. 224 Hence, a taxpayer's
communications to a tax practitioner, even those considered "tax advice" are
not protected under § 7525 in any civil proceeding, state and federal court
included. 225 Similarly, the tax practitioner privilege may not be asserted to
prevent disclosure of information to any regulatory agency other than the IRS,
including the Federal Trade Commission, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Environmental Protection
Agency.2 26 The FATP privilege does not apply in any of these forums. There-
fore, the IRS has the ability to use discovery in these forums as a sort of "back-
door method" of obtaining information that would otherwise be protected in
federal court.2 2 7
Fifth, the FATP privilege does not apply to advice to corporate tax shel-
ters.2 2 8 Specifically, § 7525 does not apply "to any written communication
between a federally authorized tax practitioner and a director, shareholder,
officer, employee, agent or representative of a corporation in connection with
220 Smith, supra note 66, at 244.
221 See cases discussed in Part III. A.
222 United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003). However, under the
Seventh Circuit's 2002 decision, the court articulated a four-prong test to determine whether
the identity privilege exists under the § 7525 protection: (1) Was the purpose of the transac-
tion to provide tax advice? (2) In light of such purpose and the history of the firm's repre-
sentation, would disclosing the clients' identities necessarily reveal their motives for seeking
tax advice? (3) Did the clients waive the privilege, i.e., would the IRS have been able to
ascertain the client names independent of the firm? (4) Was the document or communication
made for the purpose of preparing the clients' tax returns? According to the court, in order
for the clients' identities to be privileged under § 7525, the answers to the first two questions
must be yes, and the answers to the last two questions must be no. BDO Seidman, 2002 WL
32080709 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see also Confidentiality-How Protected is Communication With
a Tax Advisor? CONrROLLER's TAx LETTER, July 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8916737.
Thus, it is unclear how relevant these inquires are in light of the 2003 opinion.
223 I.R.C. § 7525(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2004).
224 Smith, supra note 66, at 245.
225 Id. Some states have enacted statutes providing an accountant-client privilege.
Lobenhofer, supra note 114, at 256. Although, these state statutes normally apply only to
public accountants, not enrolled agents or enrolled actuaries. Id.
226 See 144 CONG. REc. H5169 (daily ed. June 24, 1998).
227 Smith, supra note 121, at 245. While this may also be possible in theory, the IRS is
careful not to misuse its power in this manner in practice.
228 I.R.C. § 7525(b) (2004).
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the promotion of ... any tax shelter."'229 Because the definition of "tax shelter"
may be interpreted broadly, almost any corporate tax-advantaged transaction
might fall outside the FATP privilege. 23° This is yet another reason why tax-
payer reliance on §7525 is ill advised, especially with respect to corporations.
Another limitation is that § 7525 does not extend work product protection
to the tax advisor. As discussed in Part II.B(2), the work product doctrine
protects the work of the attorney prepared in anticipation of litigation, including
information gathered from third parties and items that reflect the attorney's
mental impressions.23 1 The work product doctrine is completely separate from
the attorney-client privilege. Thus, while the FATP privilege is a limited ver-
sion of the attorney-client privilege, § 7525 does not extend the work product
doctrine to non-attomey tax advisors.23 2
The privilege must be asserted and care must be taken not to waive it.
With respect to claiming the § 7525 protection, it is unclear whether the client
or the tax practitioner must assert it. Since the FATP privilege is modeled after
the attorney-client privilege, a sound inference is that § 7525 also adheres to
the principle that it is the client's privilege to claim.133 A potential statutory
conflict of interest between a tax practitioner and client may also exist due to
the disclosure requirements that a tax shelter promoter must comply with under
IRC §§ 6111 and 6112.234
The enactment of § 7525 has also served to increase tensions between
attorneys and non-attorneys. Since the inception of the federal income tax,
both attorneys and non-attorney advisors have guided clients with tax mat-
ters. 235 Each group has fought to obtain and maintain high-fee tax clients.
236
Prior to its passage, some attorneys opposed the FATP privilege as an assault
on their roles as confidential advisors to taxpayer-clients, as many tax lawyers
view the attorney-client privilege as a marketing advantage over non-attorney
tax practitioners.23 7 In addition, some attorneys fear that accountants may
229 Id. Efforts have also been made to expand this exception to include all tax advice con-
cerning tax shelters, not just corporate tax shelters. Smith, supra note 66, at 245.
230 Lobenhofer, supra note 114, at 258. Recall that one definition of tax shelter is "a part-
nership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrange-
ment, if a single purpose of such partnership, entity, plan or arrangement is the avoidance or
evasion of Federal income tax." I.R.C. § 6662(d)(C)(iii) (2004).
231 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
232 See Lobenhofer, supra note 114, at 259. Obviously, protecting the client's original
communications would not do much good if all of the tax advisor's subsequent internal
memos and analysis were not privileged as well. Smith, supra note 66, at 246.
233 Smith, supra note 66, at 246-7.
234 There are no ethical rules governing a tax practitioner's commitment to a taxpayer-
client's assertion of privilege. Id. at 247. Although, §§ 6111 and 6112 likely trump the
FATP protections or create an implied waiver regarding the privilege. Id. Equally uncertain
is when and how a taxpayer waives the § 7525 protection. Section 7525 and its legislative
history do not address waiver specifically, but most likely, it follows the waiver rules of the
attorney-client privilege (which also make the attorney-client privilege very tenuous). Id.
235 See Johnson, supra note 114, at 1041.
236 Id. at 1046.
237 Id. Some commentators have described it as a "watershed for the accounting industry,"
one of the first "volleys" in a "war," and even a "holy war," between the legal and account-
ing professions. Id. (citations omitted).
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attempt to expand their new privilege.238 Section 7525 is perpetuating this
cycle of competitiveness by attempting to level the playing field with a privi-
lege that falls short; the two groups are better off fending for themselves in
their separate professional spheres.
Moreover, the concept of privilege is inconsistent with the accountant's
role as "public watchdog. '2 39 Tax advisors are not under the same duty as
attorneys to zealously advocate a client's position.240 A tax practitioner, partic-
ularly a public certified accountant, performs a different role by assuming a
"public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client
... [he or she] owes ultimate allegiance to.. . the investing public ... [and]
complete fidelity to the public trust.
'
"241
In addition, § 7525 complicates the tax advisor's role. Notwithstanding
how well versed they may be with respect to the IRC, tax advisors lack the
training to assert the privilege correctly and to avoid waiving it.24 2 While most
attorneys gain a proficient understanding of evidentiary and client confidential-
ity concepts in law school, accountants undergo no such training in privilege
law and are therefore not accustomed to applying it.243 As such, the intricacies
of the FATP privilege may frequently compel tax advisors to seek legal advice
regarding § 7525's scope and limitations. 2 ' The new privilege might possibly
make tax practitioners more reliant on attorneys than they were prior to
§ 7525's enactment.24 5
Finally, § 7525's scope is so limited that the identity privilege is question-
able under FATP protection. While courts have found that the attorney-client
privilege may shield client names under certain circumstances, it appears as
though there is a movement away from this view to allow for the disclosure of
investor names in tax shelters. 46
In short, because of the many limitations and pitfalls associated with the
§ 7525 FATP privilege, it should be eliminated. At the very least, while the
privilege remains in existence, those seeking tax advice on confidential matters
would be wise to consult an attorney rather than another type of tax
practitioner.
238 Id.
239 Smith, supra note 66, at 244.
240 Id. at 237.
241 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-8 (1984). While true in theory,
in light of recent scandals (e.g., Enron and Worldcom), this might not be true in practice.
242 Lobenhofer, supra note 114, at 262; see also Johnson, supra note 114, at 1045.
243 Lobenhofer, supra note 114, at 262; see also Johnson, supra note 114, at 1045. That
sanctions or penalties may be imposed for unmerited claims of privilege is another pitfall of
the FATP privilege. While sanctions are not justified so long as there is a reasonable basis
for claiming the privilege, tax practitioners, not being trained in asserting privilege, may fall
prey to the IRS's frustration with inappropriate privilege assertions. See Smith, supra note
65, at 252. For discussion on prospective initiatives contemplated by the IRS, see, e.g.,
Kenneth A. Gary & Sheryl Stratton, Top Regulators Weigh In On Shelters, TAx NOTES,
Nov. 24, 2003, at 947; Thomas F. Field, Tax Shelters: Have The Ethics Changed?, TAX
NOTES, Nov. 17, 2003, at 823; Heather Bennett & Timothy Catts, No Single 'Silver Bullet' to
Deter Tax Shelters, Jenner Says, TAx NoTEs, Sept. 29, 2003, at 1631.
244 Lobenhofer, supra note 114, at 262; see also Johnson, supra note 114, at 1045.
245 Lobenhofer, supra note 114, at 262.
246 See, e.g., United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003).
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2. Abolish the identity privilege in tax shelter cases
Tax shelter suits are complex and resource-intensive to prepare and file.24 7
Compared to other tax cases, abusive tax shelter cases are particularly expen-
sive to litigate.248 Nonetheless, these are costs the government is willing to
incur to combat abusive tax-advantaged transactions, which have resulted in
billions of revenue loss over the past several years.24 9
The IRS has expended a great deal of resources in its efforts to address the
growing culture of tax evasion and understatement. In order to maximize effi-
ciency, the process calls for simplification, which has been justified on grounds
related to compliance.25 ° In many ways, the tax laws are so complex or so
ambiguous that many taxpayers who intend to file accurate returns are defeated
by their inability to know with certainty what the law requires. 251 Because tax
revenue is our country's economic lifeblood, it is critical to strike a balance in
which the traditional privileges are preserved and the government's financial
objectives relating to revenue collection are not hindered.
As discussed earlier, while it is generally true that a client's name is not a
protected "communication," there is a narrow exception to this rule: the "iden-
tity" privilege. A number of courts have found that a client's identity is privi-
leged under certain circumstances.2 5 2 Nonetheless, more and more courts are
rejecting the application of the identity privilege in tax shelter cases - a definite
247 2003 TNT 204-33 (Oct. 21, 2003).
248 Id. For instance, dozens attorneys and several highly paid expert witnesses have been
employed to assist with cases. Id. The Tax Division staffs these cases at the outset with at
least two attorneys, and usually three attorneys to handle the discovery and other pretrial
work in a timely and efficient manner. The government must also hire its own private sector
experts to testify about the purported business purpose, the values of any assets or liabilities
at issue, foreign law and other subjects. Id.
249 While it is difficult to accurately determine the amount of unpaid taxes, the estimates are
astounding: One to two million taxpayers currently use foreign entities, e.g., trusts, offshore
bank accounts and partnerships, to conceal income and get around paying $40 billion to $70
billion per year in federal income taxes. Smith, supra note 66, at 247. Many more billions
have possibly been evaded in other transactions of different sorts. Id. For example, some
have estimated that individual and corporate income tax noncompliance cost the federal fisc
over $300 billion. DONALD L. BARTLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, THE GREAT AMERICAN TAx
DODGE 3 (2000).
250 Steve R. Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and
Tax Simplification, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1048 (2003). Other grounds include: (1) reduced
compliance costs for taxpayers, (2) greater popular support for the tax system, (3) greater
transparency of the system, and (4) greater fairness. Id.
251 Johnson, supra note 114, at 1049.
252 In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding special circum-
stances of case did not justify exception to attorney-client privilege to reveal identity of third
party paying on behalf of defendant since that would necessarily implicate third party's
involvement in crime). Identity may also be privileged where it provides the "last link" to
indicting the client. See United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 876-77 (8th Cir. 1995) (apply-
ing "last link" doctrine to find identity of client is privileged where it could lead to individ-
ual's conviction of federal crime while keeping in mind that "Congress cannot have intended
to allow local rules of professional ethics to carve out fifty different privileged exemp-
tions."). But see United States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
privilege does not apply where disclosure of identity might incriminate client or fee-payer,
"but only where it would convey information tantamount to a confidential communication").
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victory for the government.' In addition, there is pending legislation that
would abolish the identity privilege in tax shelter cases.2 54 This legislation, if
enacted, will further limit the applicability of privilege when a tax-advantaged
transaction is at issue; the identity of investors will no longer be protected
under any circumstances.
For the benefit of the masses, the identity privilege should be abolished to
allow the government to collect a necessary source of revenue. Caution must
be taken to not forfeit the taxpayer's entitlement to privacy by granting the IRS
unrestricted summons power.
IV. CONCLUSION
We must tread lightly when we consider granting or abolishing a privilege.
Though a privilege has been granted, it is not impossible to alter, limit, or even
abolish it. Though I advocate eliminating the FATP and identity privileges in
253 See, e.g., United States v. BDO Seidman, 337 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that,
because they failed to prove that a confidential communication would be revealed, the infor-
mation regarding the identity of clients who had consulted with a tax shelter promoter was
not protected from disclosure under § 7525 in a tax enforcement action against the promoter;
although the court's 2002 BDO opinion set up a 4-prong test to determine whether the iden-
tity privilege exists under the § 7525 protection).
254 108 H.R. 2896 (July 2003). The pending legislation states in pertinent part:
SEC. 3003. TAX SHELTER EXCEPTION TO CONFIDENTIALITY PRIVILEGES RELAT-
INGTO TAXPAYER COMMUNICATIONS.
(a) In General. Section 7525(b) (relating to section not to apply to communications regarding
corporate tax shelters) is amended to read as follows:
"(b) Section Not To Apply to Communications Regarding Tax Shelters. The privilege under
subsection (a) shall not apply to any written communication which is -
"(1) between a federally authorized tax practitioner and -
"(A) any person,
"(3) any director, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the person, or
"(C) any other person holding a capital or profits interest in the person, and
"(2) in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of the person in
any tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii))."
(b) Effective Date. The amendment made by this section shall apply to communications
made on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(5)(A) The heading for section 6708 is amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6708. FAILURE TO MAINTAIN LISTS OF ADVISEES WITH RESPECT TO
REPORTABLE TRANSACTIONS."
(B) The item relating to section 6708 in the table of sections for part I of subchapter B of
chapter 68 is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 6708. Failure to maintain lists of advisees with respect to reportable transactions."
(c) Required Disclosure Not Subject to Claim of Confidentiality.
Paragraph (1) of section 6112(b), as redesignated by subsection (b), is amended by adding at
the end the following new flush sentence:
"For purposes of this section, the identity of any person on such list shall not be privileged."
(d) Effective Date.
(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section
shall apply to transactions with respect to which material aid, assistance, or advice referred to
in section 6111 (b)(l)(A)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as added by this section) is
provided after the date of the enactment of this Act. (2) No claim of confidentiality against
disclosure. The amendment made by subsection (c) shall take effect as if included in the
amendments made by section 142 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.
GIVE 'EM SHELTER
tax shelter cases, the attorney-client privilege should remain intact. Even
though doing so may still protect some undeserving taxpayers, the innocent
taxpayers should not be punished for the misconduct of a minority. This should
not be understood as sympathy for tax shelter promoters, but instead a manifes-
tation of the reality that taxpayers who pay their fair share in taxes, as well as
those needing the law's protections in other contexts, also benefit from the
attorney-client privilege.25 Based on the foregoing, the FATP privilege and
the identity privilege should be abolished in tax shelter cases.
255 See Smith, supra note 66, at 254.
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